rights'. I will use this discussion to think again about the question 'What is to be done?' or, as I rephrase it, 'Where do we go from here?' First, the 'international polarization' thesis glosses over how norms diffusion and their relationships to gay rights function differently in the same place and at the same time at different scales. Altman and Symons' scale is generally a comparative politics scale, which evaluates sovereign nation states against one another. At this scale, the idea of 'international polarization' is easier to defend, as states taken as whole units do often differ from one another in how they rhetorically (if not always materially) support or oppose positive gay rights norms. Yet when we investigate what happens within states, the picture is much more complex.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton captured this complexity in a remark she made during the US presidential campaign. Speaking of the USA, Clinton said: 'In too many places still,
LGBT Americans are singled out for harassment and violence. You can get married on Saturday, post your pictures on Sunday, and get fired on Monday' (Rielly 2016) . This is quite a powerful statement. What it suggests is that even the policymaker who is most credited for legitimating 'the LGBT' as a universally normal human being, and for legitimating the international diffusion of the 'gay rights as human rights' norm on the back of this move (Clinton 2011) , recognises two things. First, understandings of 'the normal LGBT' now sit alongside but do not cancel out long-standing ideas about 'the LGBT' as perverse or deviant. Second, where these understandings compete for legitimacy is not only among sovereign nation states, but also within personal, local, national and regional institutions. Underscoring the stakes of these complexities, the UK Home Office (2016) issued a travel advisory to its LGBT citizens in the spring of 2016, warning them that they may no longer be safe if they visit some US states because of the proliferation of homo-, bi-and particularly trans* phobic laws in these states.
What this means is that descriptions of international politics around 'gay rights as human rights' as 'internationally polarized' are far too simple. What is required is an unpacking of the positive as well as negative ways in which norms around 'gay rights as human rights' are diffused, while charting the complex interrelationships between positive and negative 'gay rights as human rights' norms. To their credit, Altman and Symons do note some of these multi-scalar complexities, but not to the point that they acknowledge how these complexities throw their 'international polarization' thesis into question.
Second, the 'international polarization' thesis takes the 'gay rights as human rights' norm as a fully positive idea. This is why the 'international polarization' thesis can be used to describe states as 'good' or 'bad' in relation to how well they adhere to this norm. Yet, as many scholars and practitioners have pointed out, the gay rights norm itself has some problematic elements built into it.
Thinking critically about 'gay rights as human rights' through their intersection function with racism and imperialism, Jasbir Puar (2013) has written about 'the human rights industrial complex', Rahul Rao (2012) has analysed how 'gay rights' get taken up as 'gay conditionality' in public policies, and Anna Agathangelou (2013) has discussed how gay rights norms rely on anti-blackness. Anthony Langlois and Cai Wilkinson offer further complexity to the 'gay rights' debate by noting how 'gay rights' can be co-opted by a neo-imperialist agenda, without being essentially neo-imperialist in themselves (Langlois 2012; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014) . My own analysis of Clinton's speech details the positive and/or negative ways in which Clinton proposes and mobilises 'gay rights as human rights' for specific kinds of geopolitical, racialised, classed, able-bodied, gendered and sexualised subjects that have specific-if contradictory-international effects (Weber 2016a ; see also Ghosh 2016) .
Whether these scholars reject or refine a gay rights norm, they all explain why 'gay rights as human rights' is not unambiguously positive, for they all take pains to explore how toxic understandings around race, religion, class, ability and gender are historically intertwined with understandings of, particularly, 'the perverse homosexual' and, sometimes, 'the perverse bisexual' and/or 'the perverse transsexual'. And these scholars demonstrate how these historical understandings make the 'good LGBT' who has the right to have rights possible in contemporary liberal discourses on 'gay rights as human rights' (for elaborates of these points, see Weber 2016a).
In places, Altman and Symons gesture toward these kinds of concerns. Yet their dominant move is to bracket these concerns and embrace a generally uncritical liberal understanding of rights as the basis of their comparative analysis. This allows them to describe the world through their 'international polarization' thesis. This is a shame, as the careful empirical detail that Altman and Symons provide in the book speaks to the complexities on the ground which their theoretical framework excludes.
Finally, the 'international polarization' thesis may unwittingly reify 'international polarization' in practice by authorising some of the proposed mechanisms through which LGBT norms are (likely to be) indexed and diffused. For example, the United Nations Development Programme's Gender, Key Populations and LGBTI for HIV, Health and Development Team is developing an LGBTI Inclusion Index (Cortez 2015) . This Index is designed to measure education, health, mechanisms for justice and onthe-ground policing as they pertain to LGBTI people around the world. If we read this project through Clinton's observation that 'gay rights as human rights' are unevenly embraced and enforced not only across states, but also within states, then a couple of concerns come to the fore.
One such concern is that this Index may well allow Western liberal states to appear to be 'sufficiently progressive' on the things that the Index does measure, so they do not have to do more to protect their LGBTI people on the things the Index does not measure (like access to jobs, housing and health care). This may actually narrow the scope of accountability on 'gay rights as human rights' rather than broaden it. It might prevent Western states from thinking further about their 'progress' on 'gay rights as human rights' and from doing more to improve the lives of LGBTI people on the ground. It might also allow particularly Western liberal states to notice only those things they do better than other kinds of states, without acknowledging and fixing those problems they have in common with, for example, non-Western and/or illiberal states.
Overall, then, the LGBTI Index might inadvertently further stigmatise states that are seen as insufficiently 'progressive' in accepting and implementing norms around 'gay rights as human rights, in ways that might fuel rather than challenge 'international polarization'.
So, where do we go from here? I am not claiming that there is not some 'international polarization' around 'gay rights as human rights' or that charting how 'international polarizations' are constructed and mobilised is not an ongoing problem. The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States of America and (at the time of this writing one week after Trump's election) Trump's friendly relationship with Vladimir Putin, coupled with the anti-LGBT people Trump is appointing, underscores this point (see Weber 2016b). But as we take seriously some 'international polarizations' and their realignments, we must also bear in mind broader issues about and around 'gay rights as human rights'. By way of conclusion, let me mention two sets of questions we should keep in mind.
First, what does the language of 'gay rights as human rights' actually deliver for LGBT people? How does it make their lives more and less liveable? As it is being translated into domestic and international policies, do these policies recognise and address the uneven distribution and implementation of 'gay rights as human rights' not only across states, but also at other scales, across other issues and in the complex ways rights function? How can we make policy practitioners take seriously every scale that bears on the lives of LGBT people-intimate, familial, local, national, regional and international? How can we make them consider the range of rights that matter to LGBT people-not just marriage or military service, but also work, housing, education, health care and freedom of movement? How can we get them to take into account the complex ways in which 'gay rights as human rights' are rendered national and international in relation to gender, race, religion, ability and class, for example? And how can we make policy practitioners do these things in ways that acknowledge and defy the 'international polarization' thesis?
Second, what are the limits of human rights language itself? Human rights language can be extremely valuable. But we should also explore other discourses and terms of reference to secure what we understand as human rights for LGBT people that can be better heard. This is both because some people reject the language of universal human rights as neocolonialist or imperialist, while others refine the language of universal human rights to capture only those rights that are compatible with what some call the 'universal traditional values of mankind'-a term that retains pejorative understandings of LGBT sexualities as sinful and criminal (Altman and Symons 2016, 111) .
I have no doubt that I share these concerns with Altman and Symons. I look forward to thinking with them about these sorts of issues, through and beyond frameworks of 'international polarization'.
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